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Abstract: Notoriously, the dispositional view of natural properties is thought to face a number of regress 
problems, one of which points to an epistemological worry. In this paper, I argue that the rival 
categorical view is also susceptible the same kind of regress problem. This problem can be overcome, 
most plausibly, with the development of a structuralist epistemology. After identifying problems faced 
by alternative solutions, I sketch the main features of this structuralist epistemological approach, 
referring to graph-theoretic modelling in the process. Given that both the categoricalists and 
dispositionalists are under pressure to adopt this same epistemological approach in light of the regress 
problem, this suggests that the categoricalist versus dispositionalist debate is best fought on metaphysical 
rather than epistemological grounds. 
 
1. Introduction: the categoricalism versus dispositionalism debate 
Categoricalism is, roughly, the view that the nature of a property is not exhausted by the nomic role(s) 
it plays. Rather, properties have a primitive, self-contained essence: they are what are known as 
quiddities (Black 2000). Proponents of this view include Armstrong (1983) and Lewis (2009). The 
opposing view is dispositionalism (or what is sometimes known as causal structuralism or the 
‘powers’ view). On this view, the nature of a property is exhausted by its nomic dispositional role(s): 
properties are nothing more than dispositions. Proponents of this view include Bird (2007), Mumford 
(2004) and Shoemaker (1980). 
   Those familiar with the dispositionalism versus categoricalism debate will know that 
dispositionalism is often criticised on the basis that it faces a variety of regress problems, one of 
which points to an epistemological worry. The worry is, roughly, that in order to be able to 
differentiate any disposition, we need to know which causal manifestation(s) it is a disposition for. 
But because, in a dispositional world, the manifestation property will itself be dispositional in nature, 
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it can only be discriminated in terms of its manifestation and so on, meaning that the epistemic buck is 
continually passed (see for example Swinburne 1980, pp. 316-19). In contrast, no such regress 
problems have typically been raised for categoricalism. Epistemological objections to categoricalism 
have, instead, focused mainly on certain ‘quiddistic’ sceptical scenarios. In this paper I argue, 
however, that categoricalism faces an epistemological regress problem which is precisely analogous 
to that facing dispositionalism. Moreover, this problem is one that persists even once the 
aforementioned sceptical problem has been assuaged. The regress in question is revealed as soon as 
we ask the question of how, on the categoricalist picture, the various nomic roles played by properties 
in our world can be differentiated. I call this the nomic regress problem. After outlining the nomic 
regress problem, I argue in section three that certain ways of attempting to terminate the regress are 
not wholly satisfactory. Fortunately, though, there is a more promising structuralist epistemology that 
may be pursued. After outlining the structuralist epistemological approach in section four, I identify in 
section five a residual epistemological worry that persists whichever solution to the regress is adopted.  
Before proceeding, it is should be emphasized that my concerns in this paper do not touch upon the 
metaphysical merits and problems of dispositionalism and categoricalism. While I argue that 
dispositionalism and categoricalism are likely to be on a par where epistemology is concerned, that is 
not to say that the debate will not be settled on metaphysical grounds. For example, it is often argued 
that the regressive nature of dispositionalism is metaphysically problematic in a way that 
categoricalism is not. The version of the metaphysical regress problem that Bird (2007, p. 523) thinks 
is the most serious for dispositionalism concerns the determinacy of a disposition’s identity. Critics 
have worried that because, according to dispositionalism, the identity of each and every property is 
fixed by its relations to further properties, when we come to pinning down the identity of a property, 
we either set off on an infinite regress of relations or come back around in a circle to the property in 
question (see Lowe 2006, p. 138 for example). Others have also worried that if properties are nothing 
more than dispositions, and dispositions are wholly characterized by their relations to further 
dispositions (which are in turn are characterized by relations to further dispositions, and so on), then it 
is difficult to see how reality could be substantial enough to give rise to the world we inhabit. In 
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Heil’s words, ‘[T]he result is a holism empty of content’ (2003, p. 108). One way of fleshing out this 
worry is suggested in a discussion by Jacobs (2011). If substances are bundles of properties on the 
dispositional picture, and those properties are constituted relationally, then we are left with a wholly 
relational view of the world, which Jacobs finds very implausible (2011, §2). On the other hand, if a 
substance-attribute view of particulars is accepted, particulars will be robbed of any intrinsic, monadic 
properties (Jacobs 2011, §2). In response, Jacobs argues that properties should not be construed as 
purely dispositional (2011, §3). I suspect that Jacobs is right about this, but since our concerns in this 
paper are epistemological, we must set these metaphysical issues aside for another occasion.  
 
2. Premilinaries: previous discussions of categoricalism and epistemology 
Epistemological anxieties with respect to categoricalism have already been raised in recent literature. 
However, these discussions have tended to focus on certain ‘quiddistic’ sceptical worries (see for 
example Black (2000), Langton (2004), Lewis (2009), Schaffer (2005), Shoemaker (1980)). Given 
that there is more to a property than its nomic role(s) on the categoricalist picture, it seems coherent to 
suppose there is a possible world w with the same nomic structure and same properties as ours, but in 
which the properties take different places within that structure in w (see Black 2000). Putting the point 
in a more regimented fashion, Lewis considers the Ramsey sentence that will fall out of our final 
scientific theory about which properties play which roles (2009, p. 206). To formulate a Ramsey 
sentence, we conjoin all of the law statements expressed in our final scientific theory, and replace all 
of the property names with variables. Then, we prefix each variable with the existential quantifier, 
leaving us with a summary of the world’s fundamental nomic structure. Quiddistic scepticism, Lewis 
says, is generated by the fact that, on his view, Ramsey sentences are multiply realizable (2009, p. 
207). That is, because properties are distinct from their roles on his view, the same Ramsey sentence 
could be true of our world and possible world w, but with the nomic roles being filled by different 
properties in w.1 But this means there is no way for us to discriminate between our world and world w. 
Plausibly, we can only become acquainted with properties by causally interacting with them, i.e., by 
observing their causal nomic roles, and given that our world and w have the same nomic structure, 
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they will appear the same from our epistemic perspective. On Lewis’s view, then, there are facts about 
the underlying natures of the nomic role occupiers, i.e., the natural properties, of which we are 
‘irremediably ignorant’ (Lewis 2009, p. 214).  
    There are, however, ways in which a categoricalist might attempt to assuage this worry. Note, first, 
that the multiple realizability of the Ramsey sentence is not an automatic consequence of 
categoricalism. This problem only arises if it is accepted that properties occupy nomic roles 
contingently. An alternative option would be to allow that although properties have a categorical 
aspect to them, they have their nomic roles essentially rather than contingently. Hawthorne calls this 
the ‘dual aspect’ view (2006, p. 212; see also Tugby 2012). Alternatively, those who are sceptical 
about essences could hold that the nomic relations between categorical properties hold as a matter of 
brute external necessity (see for example Fales (1993)). By external, we mean that those relations do 
not flow from the intrinsic natures of the relata. (An internal relation, in contrast, is typically thought 
of in this context as a relation which is entailed by the intrinsic natures of the relata2). A consequence 
of either of these views is that properties play the same nomic roles in all possible worlds. If one took 
this view, the assumption which leads to global quiddistic scepticism – that properties could swap 
nomic roles in other possible worlds – would be blocked.  
But what is the state of play for neo-Humeans, like Lewis, who hold that properties have their 
roles contingently? Shaffer (2005, p. 20) argues that the quiddistic scepticism which falls out of the 
multiple realizability of Ramsey sentences is really just a version of external-world scepticism 
restricted to properties. And philosophers do not lose much sleep over external-world scepticism, even 
though most would accept the metaphysical possibility of sceptical scenarios. A number of strategies 
have been developed to blunt the force of external-world scepticism, and these strategies are ones 
which categoricalists could employ to soften quiddistic scepticism, argues Schaffer (2005, pp. 20-4). 
Indeed, Lewis (1996) himself has one such strategy in his armoury, namely contextualism (see 
Langton 2004, pp. 133-5, who explores this strategy in the context of quidditism).  
What would be a worry for most quidditists, including Lewisian quidditists, is if quidditism did not 
allow for determinate reference where property terms are concerned. But according to Lewis, 
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determinate reference is perfectly possible on his view providing the Ramsey sentence is uniquely 
realized in our world (2009, p. 107). This would allow our property terms to hook onto the quiddities 
via uniquely satisfied definite descriptions concerning their roles. Even if we do not grasp the essence 
of the properties they refer to, this does not undermine Lewis’s commitment to metaphysical realism 
provided we know that our property terms refer. Moreover, as Hawthorne argues, we seem to be in a 
similar situation with other terms as well. Our ability to refer to Saul Kripke does not consist in an 
ability to take a ‘cognitive photo of his haecceity’ (Hawthorne 2006, p. 218). Rather, this ability 
typically exploits the features Kripke happens to have, for example the relationships he stands in.   
In short, then, there are two main responses to quiddistic scepticism. The first is to reject the 
multiple realizability of Ramsey sentences by holding a view on which properties and their nomic 
roles are not contingently related. The second categoricalist view accepts that properties have their 
roles contingently, but holds that this does not matter as long as the nomic structure is uniquely 
realized. Although we may not know which properties our terms refer to, this is something we can 
live with, just as we can live with the metaphysical possibility of Cartesian sceptical scenarios. 
My own view is that out of these two options, the first is preferable. I will not argue for this here, 
however. The point I want to make in this paper is that whichever of these two strategies one uses to 
blunt the force of quiddistic scepticism, an epistemological regress problem remains, one which is 
precisely analogous to that facing dispositionalism. It is to this problem that we now turn.   
 
3. A more serious epistemic challenge 
3.1 The nomic regress problem 
It seems, then, that the typical epistemological worry raised against categoricalism is not too 
damaging. And we have also seen the kind of picture categoricalists present with respect to what it is 
that scientific theories, at least in part, must achieve: namely, to tell us enough about the laws so that 
Ramsey sentences can in principle be formulated. Our theories can then identify quiddities such as, 
say, charge, as those properties which, in our world, play such-and-such roles. So far, so good. 
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   But let us now take a step back. How, in principle, could the various nomic roles within a world 
ever be differentiated in the first place, if categoricalism is true? To answer this question, we must 
consider how the nomic role of a natural property, call it F, could be distinguished.  
   Now, a property’s nomic role is determined by the natural laws which that property enters into. 
Laws, in turn, serve to relate certain properties to others. In order to pin down the nomic role of some 
property F, we must therefore determine which other property (call it G), or properties, F is nomically 
related to. 3 In the case of causal laws, this involves asking which property F is disposed to cause (or, 
to speak less loosely, this involves asking what causal changes particulars instantiating F are able to 
bring about, in virtue of having that property).   
   But here is where the regress I warned of earlier begins to bite. If categoricalism is true, then it will 
not be very illuminating to learn that F’s role is such that F is related to property G. This will only 
allow us to discriminate F’s nomic role from other roles if property G can itself be discriminated from 
other properties. But of course, since property G is nothing more than an ineffable quiddity, there will 
be no immediate way of discriminating property G from any other property. We are therefore no 
closer to being able to differentiate F’s nomic role. So what can we do at this point? Well, insofar as 
we can attempt to identify property G at all, we can only do so by asking further questions about 
which distinctive nomic roles it plays, as compared with others. And in order to discriminate the 
nomic role of G from other nomic roles, we must of course find out what it is that G is nomically 
related to. But again, the property (or properties) to which G is nomically related, call it H, will be 
nothing more than a quiddity, which in itself cannot be discriminated from any other. But unless H 
can be discriminated from other properties, the nomic role of G cannot be distinguished from other 
nomic roles. At this point, then, we have no choice but to try to discriminate H in terms of its 
distinctive role(s), and so on. Either an infinite regress threatens or, if the number of properties is 
finite, we are left with a circle of nomic roles which brings us back to where we started.  
   Before considering potential ways of terminating this regress, a quick clarification about the nature 
of the regress worry is needed, so that potential confusion is avoided. The worry here is not that the 
definitions of properties will be viciously circular. As Shoemaker has for example shown, Ramsey 
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sentences can be employed to yield functional definitions of properties which get around the circular 
definition worry (see Shoemaker 1981 for further details). The worry here is, rather, how the nomic 
roles of properties can be recognised and differentiated from others on the categoricalist picture, 
something which it is clearly important for the scientist to be able to do. These are distinct issues: It is 
clearly one thing to give an analysis or definition of a concept, but yet another to show how the things 
picked out by those concepts can be recognised. For example, one might define the good in terms of 
that which brings about the most happiness, but knowing how to discriminate the things which bring 
about the most happiness is a further matter. 
   Now that the main features of the regress worry have been outlined, we will in the following 
subsections consider three ways in which one might try to terminate the regress. I will suggest, 
however, that none of these approaches are entirely satisfactory. In section four I will outline an 
alternative which I take to be a more promising way of viewing the epistemology of properties. 
 
3.2 The locational property solution 
One way of terminating this nomic regress would be to differentiate G in terms of roles that are not 
nomic. For example, in a discussion of how unsatisfactory symmetries can be avoided in our final 
scientific theory, Lewis says that properties may be said to have locational roles (2009, p. 207) as 
well as nomic roles. The locations of properties are, it seems, independent of their nomic roles, and so 
if, say, property G could be differentiated in terms of its locational role(s), thereby terminating the 
regress, we could then complete our task of differentiating the nomic role of F. We could differentiate 
it as the role that relates F nomically to the property (G) which plays such-and-such locational roles.  
   The locational solution is admirably simple, but unfortunately it is difficult to see how it could work 
in the case of the nomic regress. It is indeed the case that, metaphysically, locational roles are 
independent of nomic roles. But as Ellis (2012, p. 21) and others have pointed out, it is not the case 
that the locations of entities can be ascertained, epistemically, independently of the exercise of causal 
powers (i.e., nomic roles). But this is precisely what the solution requires, given that the regress is an 
epistemological one concerning nomic roles. The problem is that we can no more directly ascertain 
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the various locations of quiddities as we can the very existence of those quiddities. In either case we 
need first to be acquainted with the nomic role(s) of the relevant properties. To illustrate, let us 
assume that property G belongs to an electric field of a certain kind. How could a physicist ascertain 
all of the locations of this kind of field? Well, to ascertain the presence of a field at any given 
location, the physicist would have to test whether an effect characteristic of that field (in response to a 
certain stimulus) occurs. But knowing which test(s) to implement precisely requires further 
knowledge of the field’s nomic role. And if this further knowledge of G’s nomic role is required, then 
we have not terminated the regress at all. For in ascertaining G’s nomic role, we are again faced with 
the same challenge we faced in our initial task of differentiating the nomic role of F.   
 
3.3 The ‘pure quiddity’ solution 
   Another way the regress or circularity would be terminated would be if there was a property in the 
sequence which, although it could be instantiated as an effect of something else, would not itself have 
any effects. Such a property would not have, in other words, any forward-looking nomic roles. A 
property of this sort would allow the regress or circle of nomic differentiation to terminate, because 
we would arrive at a point at which there were no more nomic roles to discriminate. This scenario is 
perfectly possible on some versions of categoricalism. If properties play their roles contingently, for 
example, there seems no reason why a property might not have any forward-looking roles at all.  
    Is this response to the nomic regress worry a good one? I do not think so. Even if we were in a 
world in which the regress is terminated in this way, we would arguably be in a world in which we are 
in an even worse epistemic predicament. In the first instance, since such a world would contain a 
‘pure’ quiddity (i.e., one which has no forward-looking roles), it seems it would be a world with 
features which are beyond the grasp of the scientist. Having no causal power, this pure quiddity would 
not affect the scientist or her instruments in any way, and so would be an entity that is forever hidden. 
But worse is yet to come. The imperceptibility of this pure quiddity would have a knock-on effect 
with respect to our nomic discrimination of the other quiddities. Let us imagine that our world 
contained three properties: F, G and H. Suppose that F plays the role of bringing instances of G into 
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the world, G plays the role of bringing instances of H into the world, but that H has no forward-
looking nomic roles whatsoever. Because H is a pure quiddity, the sequence of nomic roles is indeed 
terminated. The problem is, however, that if H would forever remain hidden (for reasons described a 
moment ago), it is hard to see how the nomic roles of F and G could themselves be identified. For if 
the nomic role of G is to bring about instances of H, and H is hidden from us, we would not be able to 
recognise that G instances have a causal impact. From our perspective, G would itself appear to have 
no causal power, since the effects it would bring about (i.e., H instances), would be imperceptible to 
us. This means, therefore, that we would be blind to the presence of G instances, just as we would be 
blind to the presence of H instances. But this would clearly have yet another knock-on effect where 
our recognition of F is concerned. If we were blind to the presence of G, and the nomic role of F is to 
cause instances of G, then we would be blind to the effects that F has also. In short, introducing pure 
quiddities as a way of terminating the regress appears to create an epistemological disaster.  
Now, in response, it may be correctly pointed out that this worry only succeeds if a certain view of 
perception is assumed. The claim that we would be blind to the existence of pure quiddities rests on 
the thought that we can only perceive things via their causal effects on us (or our instruments). But if 
we reject views of perception which always require causal relations with the entities perceived, and 
accept that, say, we are acquainted with a certain class of properties in a more immediate way, then 
perhaps quiddities could be directly discriminated, thereby terminating our regress in a more 
satisfactory way. Indeed, this would solve problem regardless of whether some quiddities are pure. 
With this in mind, then, let us consider in the next subsection whether the categoricalists could solve 
the regress problem by accepting this ‘direct acquaintance’ approach. Unfortunately, we will see that 
although this solution is more promising than those just considered, such a position nonetheless brings 
its own challenges.  
 
3.4 The ‘direct acquaintance’ solution 
The ‘direct acquaintance’ solution relies on the claim that although most categorical properties can 
only be discriminated via their causal roles, there is a special class of properties which we can 
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discriminate directly. Such direct discriminations would allow the epistemological buck-passing to 
terminate.4 Such a strategy would, incidentally, serve also to weaken the general quiddistic scepticism 
discussed earlier, for while it would still be true that we are irremediably ignorant about the true 
natures of most properties, there would nevertheless be a select group of properties into whose 
essence we could gain direct insight. For this reason, Lewis (2009, p. 217) himself discusses this kind 
of view in his paper on quiddistic scepticism (see also Locke 2009, §6.2). The most plausible 
candidates for these ‘directly accessible’ properties, he says, would be mental phenomenal properties, 
or ‘qualia’. As Dennett remarks, qualia have traditionally been thought to have four defining features: 
they are ‘properties of a subject’s mental states which are 1) ineffable, 2. intrinsic, 3. private, and 4. 
directly or immediately apprehensible in consciousness’ (1998, p. 43, 47). As qualia have the special 
epistemic status of being graspable in an unmediated way, they seem precisely the kinds of properties 
which could allow the nomic regress to be halted, provided they are genuine worldly properties.  
   Is this an attractive route? As mentioned already, I take it to be the most promising route considered 
thus far, but unfortunately it faces two major problems. The first is simply that, according to 
eliminativists like Dennett, there are no good reasons for supposing that qualia exist. To use a 
distinction drawn by Block, Dennett (1991) does away with the notion of phenomenal consciousness, 
and attempts to account for our mental lives only in terms of what Block calls access consciousness 
(1995, p. 238). Access consciousness, unlike phenomenal consciousness, does not involve special 
access to qualia, and concerns only the state of being poised to utilise perceptual information in 
rational processes guiding speech and action. Since such processes can be characterised purely in 
terms of causal/functional and intentional relations, this view of consciousness has no need to bring 
relations of direct apprehension into the story. Perhaps we can call phenomenal information ‘qualia’ if 
we like, but they are not private and immediately apprehensible in the way outlined above. We need 
not go into the details of these arguments here, however. The first point to highlight is just that the 
existence of directly accessible qualia is a matter of dispute.  
The second relevant point, which we will now address, is that even if directly accessible qualia are 
accepted, it remains a matter of dispute as to whether qualia and in particular non-causal relations of 
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direct acquaintance can be accommodated within thoroughly physicalist frameworks—frameworks 
which most categoricalists will want to accept.5 Levine (2007; see also Schroer 2012) introduces the 
worry in a discussion of the explanatory gap problem concerning physicalist accounts of phenomenal 
properties. Ironically, many physicalists have appealed to relations of direct awareness (or what 
Levine calls relations of ‘acquaintance’ (2007: 158)) in order to assuage this explanatory gap worry. 
But according to Levine, this serves only to delay the problem, as it is difficult to see how relations of 
acquaintance can themselves be understood as anything other than non-physical cognitive relations. In 
order to appreciate the worry, it will be helpful to briefly rehearse Levine’s discussion here.  
The explanatory gap problem is essentially that of explaining how it is that qualia can be 
understood as physical properties, as physicalism requires. Notoriously, for example, Jackson’s case 
of Mary (1982) suggests that no matter how much knowledge of physics one has, such knowledge 
will not capture the essence of phenomenal properties. Facts about what it is like to, say, experience 
redness, appear not to be derivable from the physical facts, which presents a prima facie reason for 
thinking that physical properties and phenomenal properties are distinct.  
Now, while many physicalists accept that there is this explanatory gap, they argue that such a gap 
is to be expected, despite phenomenal properties being identical with physical properties. In other 
words, they attempt to explain away the explanatory gap problem. The reason the explanatory gap 
exists, they argue, is not that phenomenal states are non-physical, but rather because of the differences 
between the modes of presentation involved in our physical concepts and our phenomenal concepts 
(Levine 2007, p. 149). Although phenomenal concepts refer to the same properties as certain of our 
physical concepts (namely, physical properties), those concepts access those properties in very 
different ways. It is precisely at this point that the aforementioned relations of acquaintance, which 
bring cognitive immediacy, are appealed to. While nonphenomenal concepts are said to pick out their 
referents via our causal relations with them, phenomenal concepts present their objects in a more 
direct, introspective (non-causal) manner.   
How precisely, though, are these direct relations of acquaintance to be understood? The classical 
view of Loar (1990) is that phenomenal concepts are recognitional concepts, which involves the idea 
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that the referents of phenomenal concepts (i.e., the phenomenal properties) serve as their own (non-
contingent) mode of presentation. They are, in other words, self-representing, which is why we 
directly recognise the states in question. According to Perry’s version (2001), the direct nature of 
phenomenal awareness arises from the fact that phenomenal concepts function in the same way as 
demonstratives and indexicals. Thus understood, it is not surprising that theories couched in purely 
causal terms miss out certain aspects of our perceptual lives, given that our physical theories typically 
do not involve indexicals (Perry 1977). Unfortunately, we cannot go into the details of these variants 
here, but this is not essential, because all that matters for our purposes is that these views have 
something important in common. As with the recognitional view, in order for phenomenal concepts to 
function in the same way as indexicals and demonstratives, an instance of the property picked out 
must be incorporated in some way into the phenomenal concept itself, by serving as its own mode of 
presentation. In contrast, as nonphenomenal concepts present their referents via causal intermediaries 
(often with the help of scientific instruments), our access to those referents is less direct.  
In short, then, on these views our access to phenomenal properties is distinctive in that the 
phenomenal property itself is present in our representation of it. At this point, though, it is important 
to remember that this story is supposed to be compatible with physicalism, or what Levine calls the 
‘materialist constraint’ (2007, p. 150). That is, the representation in question must be something that is 
physically implemented, and this means that talk of phenomenal states being ‘present’ in their 
representation can only be a physical presence. But Levine argues that this constraint serves only to 
give rise to a further explanatory problem: ‘how does the presence of the relevant state within the 
physical implementation of the representation become something of which we are aware?’ (2007, p. 
163). The worry here is that there remains a mystery how the physical presence of phenomenal 
properties (in, say, a person’s brain) should give rise to a cognitive  presence. It seems facts about 
cognitive presence could not be derivable from facts about physical presence, and we cannot appeal to 
any further causal facts to do the explaining, because the whole point of appealing to phenomenal 
representation as a special kind of awareness is that such awareness is not causally mediated. At 
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present, then, Levine thinks it is difficult to see what a physical explanation of cognitive acquaintance 
could look like, suggesting that relations of acquaintance are fundamental non-physical relations. 
How conclusive is this argument? Well, as Levine himself concedes in one place, explanatory gap 
problems are ‘not quite enough to deal materialism a death blow’ (2001, p. 86). New explanations 
may be forthcoming which can close the gap. Moreover, some physicalists would argue that there is 
not really a mystery here to be solved. For example, Papineau holds a theory akin to the indexicality 
theory outlined above, according to which phenomenal concepts represent their referents as the 
experience: “---“, with the blank being filled by the phenomenal experience being felt at the time the 
concept is employed (2002, §4.8 and 2007). Importantly, Papineau explicitly rejects the idea that this 
phenomenon involves anything like the relations of acquaintance which Levine speaks of (e.g. 
Papineau 2002, p, 56, fn. 7). The question is, then, whether we can sustain the idea that phenomenal 
experiences present themselves in a special way without thinking of those experiences as having a 
distinctive cognitive presence. Unsurprisingly, Levine thinks we cannot, and suggests that when 
Papineau speaks of the distinctive ‘feels’ which attend phenomenal concepts, as opposed to 
nonphenomenal ones, there must be something like the notion of acquaintance in play: 
  
... for the presence of the experience when exercising a phenomenal concept to make a difference, “feeling” 
it must itself carry with it awareness; it must itself rise to the level of cognitive significance. But this is 
precisely what we don’t know how to implement in a purely physical system. (2011, p. 164, fn 10).  
 
We cannot, of course, hope to settle such a large dispute here. But what seems clear, and what is 
important for the purposes of this paper, is that it is a matter of ongoing dispute whether views which 
posit a special kind of phenomenal awareness can be accommodated within thoroughly physicalist 
frameworks. And as we saw earlier, aside from that, the very existence of directly accessible 
phenomenal qualia is itself a matter of dispute. For these reasons, it would be nice to have a solution 
to the regress problem which is not hostage to the fortunes of these controversial debates in the 
philosophy of mind. Fortunately, there is such a solution, one which we will now explore.  
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4. Responding to the nomic regress: a structuralist epistemology 
      Assuming there is a finite number of natural properties, the nomic regress problem points to 
circularity rather than an infinite regress. Not all circularities (or regresses) are vicious, however. 
Some philosophical definitions are circular, for example, but that does not mean we cannot learn from 
them. Might it be, then, that in undergoing a circular sequence of role-differentiation steps, we are 
able to learn something which does, after all, allow us to differentiate the various nomic roles? 
   Well, one thing that would be achieved is that we would have explored the overall nomic structure 
of the world. Having learned about the structure of the nomic web, cannot we then simply 
differentiate each nomic role from others, in terms of their relative positions within the wider nomic 
structure? Such a strategy would, in short, involve accepting a structuralist epistemology. Indeed, this 
is precisely the kind of epistemology that the rival dispositionalists must, most obviously, accept. This 
is because dispositionalism presents, as we saw, a structuralist metaphysical view about properties, 
since on that view the nature of any property is exhausted by its directedness towards other properties. 
Thus, the obvious (and only) way of differentiating dispositions, on that view, is to find out how they 
all stand to each other in terms of the overall dispositional structure of the world. The parallel 
categoricalist move, which is equally available to those who hold the dual aspect or Lewisian view 
outlined earlier, is to say that nomic roles can be differentiated in terms of their relative positions in 
the overall nomic structure.  
   Indeed, work has already been done by the dispositionalists to show that properties can be 
discriminated perfectly well using only their structural features, and I suggest these are insights that 
the categoricalists can utilise. Bird (2007), for example, has illustrated the point using the resources of 
graph-theory. These graphs involve nodes (or ‘vertices’) which are connected via directed arcs, with 
the nodes representing the properties, and the arcs representing the nomic relations between those 
properties. These relations have a direction because, as Bird points out (2007, p. 139), nomic relations 
(or what he calls ‘manifestation’ relations) are typically asymmetric. For example, while a 
manifestation of a particle’s charge is acceleration, charge is not a manifestation of acceleration. Note 
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also that in structuralist graphs the nodes are not labeled, which indicates that they are to be 
differentiated in terms of their relational place within the overall graph. 
Now, such graphs may be understood as representing what a world may be like in terms of the 
nomic structure that obtains. And once the structure is clearly mapped out in this way, it is not 
difficult to see how the nodes in the graph can be distinguished from all others. As long as the world-
graph is asymmetric, then the properties are ‘…fully determined by the asymmetric pattern of those 
structures’ (Bird 2007, p. 146). That is, if each property has unique relational features (in virtue of 
asymmetry), each property will be distinguishable from every other. An asymmetric graph is, more 
precisely, one that is not susceptible to any non-trivial automorphisms: it cannot be rotated in a way 
which preserves the image while leaving the nodes in different positions. A simple example of such a 
graph is Figure 1., which represents a five-property structure: 
 
Figure 1. Example of an Asymmetric Graph 
   There are, of course, many details which need be added to the epistemological story. For example, 
we cannot simply identify the whole nomic structure at once: science is piecemeal, and involves 
piecing together the relationships between properties gradually. And this raises interesting questions 
concerning our points of entry into the structure. This is not the place to address such big questions in 
the detail they deserve. But what seems clear is that in building the world graph we cannot but start 
with the properties of those macro-objects which are able to have direct effects on our perceptual 
faculties, or with properties whose effects on other objects can be easily observed. After identifying 
the macro-properties via these effects, we then build outwards from there. Once we gain enough 
knowledge about the causal roles that macro-properties play, we are then able to build instruments 
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which allow us to access the deeper levels of nature. The more we build outwards from our starting 
point in the graph, the more theoretical and fundamental the properties become.  
This distinction between what appear to be ‘higher-level’ macro-properties and the ‘lower-level’ 
theoretical properties which, say, figure in our fundamental physical theories, raises the possibility of 
thinking of reality as having different, but equally objective, levels of properties. Although I cannot 
hope to settle such a large question here, it will be helpful to offer some speculations about how the 
aforementioned graphs could be interpreted by those holding different views on the levels issue. With 
this in mind I will briefly consider three common stances: what I will call the ‘levels’ conception, 
Heil’s ‘modest realist’ conception and physical reductionism.  
According to the levels conception, it is indeed thought that ‘higher-level’ predicates pick out 
unique properties which, while intimately connected with lower-level properties, are distinct from 
them. Heil discusses Searle’s view, for example, on which a higher-level property such as a thing’s 
solidity is viewed as a distinct property in its own right, though one that is ‘causally supervenient’ on 
the lower-level vibratory movements of the thing’s constituent molecules (Searle 1992, p. 119, 125). 
If Searle’s picture is correct, then in order for our graphs to reflect reality, these higher-level 
properties would have to be distinguished in some way in our graphs. One way of doing this would be 
to have two different kinds of arc: one representing Searle‘s ‘inter-level’ causal supervenience 
relations, and one representing the ‘horizontal’ nomic relations holding between properties which are 
at the same level. One way of doing this would be to use lines of different hatching for the different 
kinds of arc. 
In contrast, Heil finds the levels picture problematic. While he agrees that ‘higher-level’ predicates 
pick out objective similarities and differences in nature, he argues that such predicates do not pick out 
unique properties. Rather, things which fall under the extension of a higher-level predicate do so in 
virtue of being similar, though less-than-perfectly-similar, in ways which are salient to us (Heil 2003, 
Ch. 5). Using the example of fragility, for example, Heil remarks that when we consider the diversity 
of the things which can all be said to be fragile, it becomes implausible to think that those things all 
share a single property in virtue of which they are fragile (2003, p. 29). Rather, fragile things share 
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properties which are physically similar, though not perfectly similar. Note, though, that this is not a 
reductionist position: these patterns of less-than-perfect similarities are fully objective and also 
projectable, given that objects with less-than-perfectly similar properties behave in less-than perfectly 
similar ways (2003, p.41). Nonetheless, these patterns of less-than-perfect similarity are not the kinds 
of patterns that we expect fundamental physics to identify. Returning to our graphs, then, this picture 
suggests it is important to distinguish not between inter-level and intra-level relations, but rather 
between nodes representing less-than-perfect similarities and nodes representing the perfect 
similarities in nature. One way of marking this distinction would be to use nodes of different colour.  
Finally, on the physical reductionist picture, ‘higher-level’ predicates may pick out perfect 
similarities, but these properties are nothing more than complex combinations of the fundamental 
physical properties. On this view, nothing would be lost from our theories about the world if higher-
level predicates were removed from our language, because statements about higher-level ‘properties’ 
and the laws they concern are derivable from statements employing only fundamental predicates (see 
Nagel 1961 for a well known statement of this model). Ultimately, then, the macroscopic/microscopic 
distinction (for example) is just a distinction between different ways of talking about the very same 
things (or in our case, the one true fundamental graph). Putting the point in terms of graphs, higher-
level predicates are more course-grained and will refer to complex portions of the graph (i.e., 
subgraphs) rather than to specific nodes. Of course, as science progresses we will often mistakenly 
associate what are in fact higher-level predicates with single nodes, precisely because we cannot 
always be sure which predicates are high-level. We currently think that sub-atomic properties and 
their corresponding predicates are fundamental, but maybe we will one day change our minds. But as 
science progresses, any nodes which are really representing something non-fundamental must 
eventually be replaced by more complex graph structure, until we are left with nodes corresponding 
only to truly fundamental predicates. On this view, then, our final graph will acknowledge neither a 
distinction between inter-level and intra-level relations nor distinctions between different kinds of 
node.      
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5. The residual problem of symmetry 
Now that this graph-based epistemology has been sketched, I want to finish by acknowledging a 
residual problem which appears to persist whichever solution to the regress problem we accept. In our 
discussion of graphs a moment ago, we saw how each and every property has a unique position in 
structures which are asymmetric. But on either the dual-aspect version of categoricalism or the 
Lewisian version, one must presumably accept the possibility, in principle, of properties with distinct 
categorical essences sharing the same nomic profiles. 6 In such cases, the overall nomic graph of such 
a world could turn out to be symmetrical. And without knowing for sure that our world is not one of 
those which instantiates a symmetrical nomic structure, we cannot rule out that when employing the 
scientific method we sometimes mistakenly identify what are actually distinct properties.7   
All that can be said at this point is that whichever solution to the regress problem is adopted by the 
categoricalists, this problem is likely to remain. For example, the advocate of the qualia approach 
(§3.4 above) is not entitled to claim victory over the structuralist approach in light of the symmetry 
problem, because that approach is also susceptible to it. Even if the intrinsic natures of phenomenal 
properties can be directly accessed by us, thereby terminating the nomic regress, we still could not 
rule out the sceptical thought of there being other distinct non-phenomenal properties which share the 
same nomic profile.  However, this is, I suspect, something we can live with, just as we can live with 
the possibility of sceptical scenarios in epistemology. As long as our world is asymmetric, then our 
scientific theories will discriminate properties perfectly well. An analogy with externalist responses to 
Cartesian scepticism is relevant here. For the externalists about knowledge, Cartesian scepticism fails 
in its aim to show that worldly knowledge is impossible. On externalist views, if we do not live in a 
deceptive world, then we do indeed have worldly knowledge. Similarly, if our world has an 
asymmetric nomic structure, then our scientific theories carve the world up perfectly well. And in 
terms of justification, we might take comfort in Armstrong’s claim that we are pragmatically justified 
in taking it that distinct properties bring distinct causal powers (1978, pp. 43-5). Although I would 
welcome a stronger response than this, perhaps it is the best we can do. 
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Finally, how do things stand with dispositionalism? Can the dispositionalists avoid the problem of 
symmetry? The answer is that it depends. Prima facie, if properties are exhausted by their nomic roles, 
then one might think there is no question of two distinct properties sharing the same nomic roles. 
However, Hawthorne takes it that if dispositionalism (or ‘causal structuralism’) is interpreted in this 
way, then it becomes an implausible view, given that symmetrical structures appear to be 
conceivable8. Lowe also makes this point forcefully, remarking that ‘[I]t surely will not do to 
proclaim as an a priori truth that the power-structure of any possible world must exhibit asymmetries 
...’ (2010, p. 18). In light of this, Hawthorne sets about outlining how dispositionalism, or what he 
calls ‘causal structuralism’, can be developed in a way that is compatible with symmetrical structures. 
Such a view is metaphysically coherent, he argues, if a counterpart theory of properties is combined 
with a rejection of quidditism. I will not go into details here, but for our purposes it is worth noting 
that even if this version of dispositionalism is successful metaphysically, the kind of epistemological 
problem discussed a moment ago remains. That is, it is hard to see how the structurally indiscernible 
properties could be discriminated by our scientific methods.9 Hawthorne concedes as much in a 
footnote: ‘[W]e normally discriminate properties by their differential impact on our sensory organs or 
on some detection instrument. But in the [symmetry] case described there is no straightforward basis 
for such discrimination’ (2006, p.224, fn. 31; word in parentheses added for clarity).  
 
6. Summary 
   Dispositionalism should not be criticised on the grounds that it faces a certain kind of 
epistemological regress problem, as categoricalists like Swinburne have tried to do. This is because 
the rival categoricalist view faces precisely the same kind of problem. Thus, in terms of epistemology, 
categoricalism and dispositionalism are in a similar boat. One of the most promising ways of 
developing the epistemology of properties, on either of these views, is to adopt a structuralist 
epistemological picture. After outlining this picture, a residual epistemological worry was identified, 
one which is likely to persist whichever solution to the regress problem is accepted.  
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1  Lewis expresses this thought in two different ways, by appealing to the permutation scenario and the 
replacement scenario. For further details see Lewis (2009). 
2 It is worth noting that the term ‘internal relation’ is a slippery one, and is used in different ways in different 
contexts. See for example Barker (2009), who distinguishes between Armstrongian, Leibnizian and Bradleyan 
internal relations (2009, pp. 246-7). The notion of internality described above is the Leibnizian one.   
3 The following regress objection can be framed without addressing the question of what, precisely, the nomic 
relation amounts to. Armstrong (1983, Ch. 6), takes the nomic relation to be a sui generis relation between 
properties. Other categoricalists view nomicity in terms of regularity relations: see for e.g. Lewis 1973, p. 73.  
4  This is how Fales, who holds something like a dual aspect view of properties, thinks the epistemology of 
properties should be tackled (1990, p. 222). 
5  See Lewis for a related worry (2009. p.217). He considers whether the fundamental quiddities could all be 
construed as qualia as a way of answering the global quidditistic scepticism discussed earlier, but he rejects this 
proposal on the grounds that qualia clash with his materialist commitments. 
6 In a forthcoming book chapter, Paul draws a similar conclusion (though from a somewhat different angle) with 
regards to Lewisian metaphysical realism. Paul argues that our scientific terms can have determinate reference 
on Lewis’s system (thereby overcoming Putnam’s model-theoretic problem), but that this is contingent on our 
world having the right kind of (non-symmetrical) structure.  
7  Localised versions of the symmetry problem have also been raised in the philosophy of mind. Those who 
accept the possibility of inverted qualia, for example, accept that two distinct qualitative experiences could play 
identical functional roles. In the case of intersubjective qualia inversion (Shoemaker, 1975, p. 197), because the 
functional roles of people’s differing experiences would be the same, the differences in those experiences would 
be completely undetectable (all the perceivers would still overtly agree on which objects count as having which 
colour, for example). This suggests, among other things, that purely functional theories of mind miss something 
out. See Shoemaker (1975) for a functionalist response. Needless to say, it would be nice for the categoricalists 
if they could find an argument to rule out functional symmetries in all cases, whether they be phenomenal or 
non-phenomenal ones.   
8 Hawthorne illustrates by asking us to consider the following scenario: ‘there are four properties, call them A, 
B, C, D. Here are the laws governing them: ANC, BNC, (A and B)ND’ (2006, p. 224). Here, A and B are 
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distinct, since their coinstantiation has different effects than is produced by single instantiations of them. Such a 
structure, Hawthorne claims, is intuitively possible yet is clearly symmetrical. 
9 The same point applies to another structuralist view which would allow for symmetrical structures, one which 
was first suggested by Shoemaker and which Hawthorne calls ‘modest’ structuralism. For details of this view 
see Hawthorne 2006, appendix, pp. 226-7. 
